10. 2006 NL: Ryan Howard
Barry Bonds won four consecutive MVP awards with insane numbers between 2001 and 2004, so perhaps after Albert Pujols finally broke through in 2005, the voters decided they wanted to show that no one was up to Bonds’ level by withholding a second consecutive award. Or perhaps they were swayed by the best storyline. Neither would surprise; either would be dumb. By VORP, which measures the number of runs a player contributed to his team above what a replacement player would have done, Pujols was the most valuable player in the league; he generated four more runs for the Cardinals than Howard did for the Phillies. He also had a higher batting average, on-base percentage, and slugging percentage, this latter in spite of the clear difference-maker in the voting, Howard’s 58 home runs. Pujols’ 11.8 WARP1, the number of wins he added to the team above a replacement player and which, unlike VORP, factors in defense, was the highest of his career to date; Howard, a below-average fielder at first, was worth three and a half fewer wins. The only categories in which Howard really prevailed were the major counting stats: home runs and RBI. The voters allowed themselves to be swayed by these gaudy numbers even though Howard did not make the playoffs and Pujols did. Howard was not a truly terrible choice for MVP, but he had no business defeating Pujols.
9. 2002
Alex Rodriguez has three MVP awards, but he should probably have more. Of course, “MVP” is usually defined by the voters as “best player on a playoff-bound team,” so perhaps it’s no surprise that Rodriguez was only recognized once (2003) prior to landing in
8. 1999
This one, though it pains me to admit it, was just a travesty. Derek Jeter was the most valuable offensive player in the American League by nearly twenty runs over the second-place Nomar Garciaparra, and was worth more than 9 wins above replacement. This remains Jeter’s best year by far: 219 hits, 24 homers, 102 RBI, 134 runs scored, a .349 batting average, .438 OBP, and .552 slugging, all still career highs. What’s more, he played on a team that won its division and he played in
7. 2006
As a casual Twins fan and Yankees hater, I was happy to see Morneau beat out Derek Jeter for the MVP in 2006, but the statistical fact of the matter is that he shouldn’t have. Morneau’s VORP of 52.0 was good for just 26th in all of baseball and just 13th in the
6. 1984
With the rise of players like Alex Rodriguez, we sometimes forget just how impressive Cal Ripken Jr. was in his prime. Some people talk like he only made the Hall of Fame because of his longevity, but the fact is that he was easily the premier offensive shortstop in the game for the better part of a decade, and he was a good fielder to boot. This is exemplified by his 1983-1984 two-season stretch in which he was worth a combined 26.1 wins above replacement, a fairly staggering number by most normal standards. Prior to the advent of sabermetrics, however, no one knew what “wins above replacement” was or how to measure it, and simply relied on traditional numbers and assumptions. How else to explain that in 1984, a year in which he led baseball in VORP and was worth more than 13 wins above a replacement player, Ripken finished 27th in the MVP voting, receiving just a single vote. Even accounting for the fact that no one knew about WARP and VORP and wouldn’t have considered them meaningful even if they had, the vote was just strange; Willie Upshaw received more votes than Ripken despite having fewer hits, doubles, home runs and RBI, fewer walks, more strikeouts, a lower batting average, and despite playing a less meaningful defensive position for a team that also did not make the playoffs (though the Blue Jays finished second while the Orioles finished fifth).
Of course the most insane part was Hernandez actually winning the award, perhaps the most egregious example of “picking a player from the team that wins” in history. It’s not that Hernandez didn’t have a great year for a relief pitcher – but he was a relief pitcher. He was the seventh-most valuable pitcher in the AL that year, although, perhaps surprisingly, he was in fact the most valuable pitcher on that Tigers squad, and since the Tigers won 104 games, well, someone had to get rewarded, and it couldn’t be a Tigers hitter since none of them had 100 RBIs and Lance Parrish, the closest to the mark with 98, had only hit .237. As vital as Hernandez was to the Tigers’ success, he illustrates the problem with just picking the best player you can think of from the best team in the league; frequently, the best team is the best team not because of one player. Replacing Hernandez with Joe Anybody would have cost the Tigers nine wins – and they still would have won 95 games and run away with the division (which, as it was, they won by 15 games). Replacing Ripken with a replacement shortstop would have cost the Orioles fully 13 wins – and they would have dropped from fifth to sixth, which of course is why no one paid any attention. And that just shows why it’s all the more important to have more sophisticated statistics – just about the only differences between Ripken’s MVP year of 1983 and his 27th-place finish of 1984 were a handful of batting average points, 16 RBIs, and his team’s finish. The fact that he could put up nearly identical seasons and have the team drop four spots in the standings tells you it’s not about one player, and if Ripken was really valuable enough to be MVP in 1983, he was valuable enough to be MVP in 1984 too. I guess it’s too much to expect that kind of consideration from old-school sportswriters.
5. 2007 NL: Jimmy Rollins
Joe Sheehan of Baseball Prospectus derided the Rollins win, saying he had won not the MVP but the “Most Valuable Copy Creator Award.” It’s a difficult charge to deny; Rollins, after all, was the most consistent player on a team that had charged from seeming doom to a playoff spot in just the last few weeks of the season, and he had that fun stat line (20+ doubles, triples, homers and stolen bases). What’s more, it wasn’t a particularly good year for NL MVP candidates; two of the four playoff teams didn’t have a single player in the voting’s top ten. Still, the writers have certainly given the MVP to non-playoff-bound players before; it happened in 2006. And by virtually no measure was Rollins even a top-five player in the league, let alone a true MVP candidate. He got on base at only a .344 clip, and failed to hit .300 despite 212 hits – thanks to his 716 at-bats, the most in league history. He was worth 9.2 wins over a replacement player, which is a pretty good number, but it wasn’t even the best on his own team, as Chase Utley put up a 9.3 despite nearly 200 fewer at-bats than Rollins thanks to injury. It can also be argued that Rollins wasn’t even the most valuable shortstop in the NL, as Hanley Ramirez had the same number of hits in 77 fewer at-bats and had a significantly higher VORP (though Rollins held a slight edge in WARP1 due to Ramirez’s defensive shortcomings).
The whole thing was probably doomed from the start, however; the league’s MVP should have been David Wright, and he couldn’t even finish top three, as voters irrationally blamed him for the Mets’ struggles down the stretch even though he hit .442 with a .492 OBP in the last two weeks of the season. Meanwhile, Prince Fielder finished third even though Wright had a better BA and OBP and was worth four more wins than Fielder, in part because Wright was a good fielder at a valuable defensive position whereas the ironically-named Fielder was a butcher at a lesser one. But the voters were swayed by Fielder’s impressive 50 home runs enough to vote him third. With that in mind, it’s hardly surprising that voters preferred Rollins and his 20-20-20-20 season over Wright, and for that matter over Matt Holliday, who wouldn’t have been the best choice either but who was at least distinguishable as the best player on his own team.
4. 2001
The 2001
3. 1985
While Mattingly wasn’t an awful choice in general, the 1985 vote proved to be yet another example of inconsistency from the writers. Mattingly did have big counting stats – 35 homers and 145 RBI – but his team missed the playoffs, while George Brett – whose VORP was much higher anyway – led the Royals into the playoffs (and eventually to the World Series, though of course voting is done before the playoffs begin). Brett’s OBP was .436, as he walked over 100 times while striking out just 49. Mattingly was also a rare strikeout (just 41 in 1985 and just 444 in a 7000-at-bat career), but he also didn’t walk nearly as much. At any event, Brett was more valuable in just about every respect, yet he didn’t win, even though the voters in the same year gave the NL MVP to Willie McGee, in part because he was the best player on the division-winning Cardinals. Mattingly wasn’t even the most valuable player on the Yankees (that honor belongs to Rickey Henderson, who had a higher VORP and was worth 13 wins above replacement, two more than even Brett; Henderson finished third in the voting), and they failed even to make the playoffs. So why did he win? Probably the RBIs; they’re just a stat it’s easy for the average voter to wrap his head around. Never mind that
2. 1987 NL: Andre Dawson
This one hurts. But not only was
1. 1995
Vaughn is another good example of a guy who wasn’t even the most valuable player on his own team. Vaughn’s 1995 VORP of 52.4 was 11th in the
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